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2Christopher James*
Commercial loan sales and the issuance ofStandby Letters ofCredit
(SLCs) involve the separation ofmany ofthe services associated with
lending, such as credit risk evaluation and underwriting, from the
funding ofa loan. These activities are shown to provide banks a way of
issuing collateralized debt claims. This ability can induce banks to
undertake profitable loan opportunities they would not undertake if
restricted to depositfinancing. Moreover, the incentives to issue collat-
eralizedclaims increase when capitalrequirements are raised. Empirical
evidence suggests that loan sales and SLCs are not important determi-
nants ofbank risk.
Over the past decade, there has been a dramatic
increase in whatis called "off-balance sheet" bank-
ing. Examples include the issuance of Standby
Letters ofCredit(SLCs) and commercial loan sales.
These activities have the commonfeature ofseparat-
ing many of the services associated with lending,
such as credit risk evaluation and underwriting,
from the funding of a loan. By separating the
funding ofa loan from these other activities, a bank
earns fee income without putting an asset or corre-
sponding liability on its balance sheet.
This paper examines two questions pertaining to
commercial loan sales and the issuance of SLCs.
The first concerns the regulatory and other eco-
nomic factors that induce a bank to separate the
funding ofa loan from the otherservices associated
with lending. The most frequently citedexplanation
for the growth ofthese activities is that they provide
banks a way of avoiding reserve requirements and
bank capital adequacy requirements.
While these regulations may provide incentives to
go "off-balance sheet," nonregulatory factors are
also important. In particular, as Benveniste and
Berger (1986) show, SLC-backed loans and com-
mercial loan sales have payoff characteristics that
are similar to secured or collateralized debt. This
observation suggests that the incentive banks have
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to sell loans or to issue SLCs may be similar to the
incentives other financial as well as nonfinancial
firms have to issue secured debt. How bank regula-
tion affects the incentives to issue collateralized
debt and the linkage between capital requirements
and off-balance activities are also explored.
A second and related question concerns the effect
of loan sales and SLC issues on the default risk of
deposits (borne by uninsured depositors and/or the
FDIC). The effects ofoff-balance sheet activities on
the risk of deposits depends on the reasons banks
undertake those activities. Forexample, one explan-
ation for the growth ofoff-balance sheet banking is
that it is a manifestation of a moral hazard problem
that is endemic to a system of fixed rate deposit
insurance pricing. Because SLCs and certain loan
sales are not subject to capital requirements, these
contingent liabilities provide a way for a bank to
increase leverage. By increasing leverage, a bank
can generate or enhance subsidies arising from
deposit insurance. This argument implies that off-
balance sheetactivities increase the risk ofdeposits.
An alternative explanation, examined in this
paper, is that loan sales and SLC issuespermitbanks
to engage in lending that they would find unprofita-
ble to undertake if they were restricted to funding
loans through deposit financing. This argument
implies that off-balance sheet activities may
enhance bank profitability and reduce bank risk.
The effect of loan sales and SLC issues on bank
risk therefore is an empirical issue. To address thisissue, the relation between the interest rate paid on
bank large CDs (greater than $100,000) and bank
asset risk, financial leverage, the volume of SLCs,
and loan sales is examined. The results reveal that
the risk premium of large CDs increases with asset
risk and financial leverage. However, no significant
relation is found between the rate paid on CDs and
eitherthe volume ofSLCs issued orloans sold. This
suggests that SLCs and loan sales are not an impor-
tantdeterminant of bank risk as perceived and
priced by large depositors.
The paperis organized as follows. In Section I, I
describe the market for SLCs and commercial loan
sales. In Section II, the reasons for the use and
growth of SLCs and loan sales are discussed. In
Section III, the effects of loan sales and SLCs on
bank risk are examined empirically. Section IV
provides a summary.
I. The Market for Commercial Loan Sales and SLCs
Commercial loan sales involve the sale ofnewly
originated commercial loans. Most commercial
loan sales are structured contractually as participa-
tions so that the selling bank maintains a creditor-
debtor relationship with the borrower. 1 This means
that the selling bank continues to be responsible for
servicing the loan, enforcingcovenants, monitoring
the financial condition of the borrower, and hand-
ling workouts and otherproblems that might arise in
the event of default. In exchange for performing
these services, the selling bank is compensated
through a "spread." The spread represents the dif-
ference between the rate paid by the borrower to the
bank and the return promised the purchaser of the
loan. An average spread of 15 basis points was
reported on commercial loan sales in the June 1,
1987 SeniorLoan Officer Lending Practices Survey
(LPS).
Current bank regulations require that loans sold
with recourse (that is, with an issuing bank's guar-
antee against default) be treated as assets when
calculatingcapitalrequirements. Moreover, the pro-
ceeds of loans sold with recourse are subject to
reserve requirements. As a result of these tegula-
tions, commercial loans are rarely sold with
recourse. 3
While loans sold without recourse avoid reserve
requirements and capital requirements, they raise
concerns with the purchaser regarding both the
quality ofloans sold (an adverse selection problem)
and the diligence with which the selling bank will
monitor the borrower after a sale (a moral hazard
problem). One technique used to provide the pur-
chaser a credible assurance of quality is for the
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selling bankto maintain orfund aportion oftheloan
sold. A second technique involves selling short-
term "strips" oflongerterm loans. While the buyer
ofthe stripis exposed to default riskin the short-run,
before the maturity date ofthe strip, the originating
bankretains exposure to defaultinthe longerrun ifit
is committed to re-financing the loan. Finally,
because most commercial loans sold are short-term
and selling banks return repeatedly to the market,
"reputational" capital (that is, the value of future
earnings, which depend on honest dealing) may
provide a mechanism for assuring quality (Gorton
and Haubrich, 1987, make this argument).
Information on the volume of commercial loans
sold indicates a dramatic increase in sales over the
past few years. Information on the volume of loan
sales comes primarily from two sources: ScheduleL
ofthe Call Report and periodic Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Surveys on bank lending practices (LPS)
conductedby the Federal Reserve System. Informa-
tion from the Call Report indicates total loans sold
increasedfrom $23 billion in 1983 to $111 billion in
1986; an increase of326 percent. A similar pattern
of growth is observable in the LPS survey data. In
November 1984, LPS respondents reported less
than $5 billion in sales. By March 1987, sales of
37.5 billion were reported. Chart 1 shows the
growth in loan sales (as reported in the Call Report)
relative to commercial and industrial (C&I) loans
outstanding over the 1984 through 1986 period.
Loan sales have grown from about 7 percent ofC&I
loan volume to almost 25 percent of C&I loan
volume over this period.credit information without funding the loan.
As discussed in the next section, the payoff or
cash flow characteristics ofan SLC-backed loan are
identical to a loan sale with full recourse. However,
unlike loan sales, SLCs are not, under current
capital regulation, considered when calculating
capital requirements. Underrisk-basedcapital stan-
dards recently proposed by the Federal Reserve
Board however, SLCs would be treated the same as
loans sold with recourse when calculating capital
adequacy requirements.4
Like the commercial loan sales market, the vol-
ume ofSLCs has grown rapidly in recent years. For
example, since 1980, SLCs outstanding have grown
at an annual rate of20 percent, from $47 billion to
$169 billion in 1986. Chart 2 shows the growth of
SLCs relative to C&I loans over the 1980 through
1986 period. As Chart 2 reveals, SLCs have grown
faster than C&I loans during the 1980s.
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The SLC Market
SLCs are similar to loan sales in that they also
involve a separation ofmany of the services associ-
ated with a commercial loanfrom the funding ofthe
loan. An SLC is a guarantee by a bank to pay one
party (called the beneficiary) ifthe bank's customer
(called the account party) fails to repay a loan or
perform some other contractual obligation (for a
descriptionofthe SLC marketsee Bennett, 1986, or
Koppenhaver, 1987). Because the bank's obligation
is contingent on the default or nonperformance of
the account party, most SLCs expire unused. For
example, a special survey conducted by the staffof
the Federal Reserve Board found that defaults by
account parties constituted only 2.03 percent of
SLCs outstanding in 1978. (Bank losses were much
smaller because 98 percent ofpayments made were
recovered from account parties.)
The majority of SLC issues are used to back
financial contracts such as commercialpaper, muni-
cipal bonds and direct loans. Because the issuing
bank assumes the credit risk associated with an
SLC-backed loan, the bank has the same incentive
to evaluate and monitor the credit risk of the bor-
rower as if it had funded the loan. SLCs therefore
provide a bank the opportunity to realize its com-
parative advantage in obtaining and processing
Payoff Characteristics
It is useful when analyzing the reasons for loan
sales and SLC issues to begin by evaluating the
payofforcash flow characteristics ofthese activities
because they determine when abank will undertake
those activities. Specifically, the focus is on factors
that affect the cash flows received by the purchaser
of a loan or the beneficiary (lender) in an SLC-
Chart 2
SLCs Have Grown Faster













1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986
Source: Report of Condition
23backed loan. The promised rate the purchaser or
beneficiary will require depends on the expected
cash flows, anddetermines the profitability ofa loan
sale or SLC issue for the bank.
The payoff characteristics of SLC loans and loan
sales with recourse, as Benveniste and Berger
(1986) have shown, are similar to the cash flow
characteristics of secured or collateralized debt.5
Consider first a loan sale made with recourse. (The
effect of removing the recourse provision on the
cash flows will be discussed later.) The loan sold is
the primary source ofcash flows to the purchaser. In
the event ofa default on the loan, the purchaser still
receives the contracted payment as long as the
selling bank does not fail. SLC-backed loans oper-
ate in a similar fashion. The primary source ofcash
flows is the loan funded. The lender receives less
than the contracted rate on the loan only when the
borrower defaults and the bank fails. If the bank
couldissue uninsured deposits secured by a specific
loan,precisely the same factors would determine
cash flows to secured depositors. Specifically, the
secured depositor would receive less than the con-
tracted payment only when the bank failed and the
cash flows on the loan serving as collateral were less
than the contracted payment due on the debt.
Loans sales with recourse and SLC-backed loans
are therefore functionally equivalent to secured debt
and should have the sameexpectedrate ofreturn ina
competitive market. The payoff characteristics of
loan sales without recourse depend solely on the
cash flows ofthe underlying loanbecausethe selling
bank issues no guarantee in the event of default.
Because banks are generally prohibited from issu-
ing collateralized deposits or debt, loan sales and
SLCs provide effective substitutes.6
II. Reasons for SLCs and Loan Sales
The reasons for the growth and use of loan sales
and SLCs can be divided into two groups: regula-
tory and non-regulatory explanations (although the
explanations are not mutually exclusive). Regula-
tory explanations focus primarily on the incentives
capital adequacy requirements, reserve require-
ments, and deposit insurances provide for issuing
SLCs or selling loans. The nonregulatory explana-
tions focus on why these activities might take place
even in the absence ofbank regulation and deposit
insurance. Both sets of explanations explain why
banks have begun increasingly to unbundle funding
from other lending activities.
Regulatory Motives
Two hypotheses have been made concerning how
regulation affects off-balance sheet banking: the
regulatory tax hypothesis and the moral hazard
hypothesis.
The regulatory tax hypothesis (see Pennacchi,
1987, and Pavel and Phillis, 1987), argues that loan
sales and SLCs are responses to burdensomeregula-
tory taxes. In particular, it says that the cost of
holding noninterest-earning reserves, the need to
meet capital requirements, and the level of deposit
insurance premiums raise the cost of funds for a
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bank above what nonbank institutions must pay.
Therefore, while a bank may have a comparative
advantage in originating and servicing loans, reg-
ulatory taxes prevent it from profitably funding
certain types of loans.
This argument implies that the cost of bank
regulation exceeds the benefits banks receive from
access to deposit guarantees and the Federal
Reserve's discount window, that is, that deposit
insurance is overpriced when regulatory taxes are
considered.
While reserve requirements unambiguously
increase the cost ofbank funds, the effect ofcapital
requirements is not well understood. In a world
without taxes and transaction and agency costs (the
costs of controlling potential conflicts between
bondholders and stockholders as well as between
managers and outside investors), the cost offinanc-
ing a loan would be independent ofa bank's capital
structure (the mixture ofdebt and equity used). This
is the famous Modigliani andMiller(1958) proposi-
tion concerning corporate capital structure. Intro-
ducing agency costs, personal and corporate taxes
have been shown to yield an optimal capital struc-
ture (see, for example, Miller, 1977, and Bamea,
Haugen and Senbet, 1981).Given these costs, ifthe maximum debt to equity
ratio set by the regulators is below what banks
would holdin the absence ofregulation (anddeposit
insurance), then capital requirements might serve to
raise the cost of bank financing above that ofnon-
bank institutions. However, because the debt to
equityratio for banksgenerallyexceeds thatofother
financial institutions (and nonfinancial firms), it is
unclear in what way capital requirements impose a
tax on banks.
An alternative hypothesis concerning how reg-
ulation and deposit insurance influence off-balance
sheet activities is the moral hazardhypothesis. This
hypothesis focuses on the incentives a bank has to
increase asset risk and financial leverage when
deposit insurance is provided at a fixed price. By
increasing leverage or the risk of its assets, a bank
can generate or enhance the subsidies associated
with fixed rate deposit guarantees. Under existing
regulation SLCs are excluded from capital require-
ments. Therefore, by issuing SLCs, a bank can
increase its financial leverage and enhance whatever
subsidies it receives from the deposit insurer.
As Pyle (1985) and others have argued, fixed rate
deposit insurance together with capital require-
ments provide incentives to undertake "off-balance
sheet" activities that increase financial leverage.
Moreover, by selling relatively low risk loans and
maintaining riskier loans in its portfolio, abank can
increase risk and therefore raise the subsidy deposit
insurance provides. The moral hazard hypothesis
predicts that off-balance sheet activities will
increase bank risk.
While regulation may enhance incentives for a
bank to engage in off-balance sheet activities, it is
unlikely that bank regulation is solely responsible.
Several institutional facts support this conjecture.
First, nonbank financial institutions, which are not
subject to the sameregulatory taxes and do not issue
insured deposits, are active participants in the loan
sales and financial guarantee markets. For example,
General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC)
sold over $7 billion in loans during 1986.8 In
addition, insurance companies issue financial guar-
antees that compete directly with bank-issued
SLCs. The volume ofthese guarantees, according to
Hirtle (1987), has grown at approximately the same
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rate as bank-issued SLCs (that is, 20 percent per
year since 1980).
Moreover, according to recent LPS surveys, a
significant portion of loans sold are purchased by
other commercial banks. For example, in 1985,
approximately halfofthe loans sold were purchased
by other domestic commercial banks (and 36.5
percent were purchased by banks with assets ofover
$1 billion). The 1987 Survey indicates that 35
percentofcommercialloans sold were purchasedby
otherdomestic banks. Because most banks (and all
banks over $1 billion in assets) are subject to the
same marginal reserve requirement on deposits and
money center banks (the primary sellers of loans)
generally hold less capital than do other banks, it is
unclear why the regulatory tax burden should be
higher for financing the same loan for money center
banks than for regionals.9
Nonregulatory Motives
Nonregulatory motives may also provide incen-
tives for separating funding from other lending
activities. SLC issues and loan sales facilitate inter-
est rate risk management and loan portfolio diver-
sification (see, for example, Pavel and Phillis, 1987,
and Koppenhaver, 1987). SLCs permit banks to
separate the interest rate risk from the credit risk
associated with a loan. With an SLC issue, a bank
can underwrite the credit risk while the beneficiary
or purchaser bears the risk of any change in the
value ofthe loan causedby unanticipatedchanges in
interest rates. Loan sales also permitbanks to invest
in and diversify across a different set of loans than
they originate and service.
Aproblem with this setofexplanations is that it is
unclear why bank stockholders would reward bank
management for these activities when presumably
they can diversify their own portfolios or hedge
interest rate risk themselves. 10
Collateralization as a Motive
A second set of nonregulatory explanations for
loan sales and SLC issues is that such activities
permit banks to issue a collateralized claim. As
shown in Section II, loan sales and SLC-backed
loans have payoff characteristics similar to secured
debt. Therefore, banks may sell loans and issueSLCs for the same reasons nonfinancial as well as
nonbank financial corporations issue collateralized
claims. Moreover, as discussed later, fixed price
deposit insurance and capital requirements can
increase the incentives for banks to issue collat-
eralized claims.
Stulz and Johnson (1985) have analyzed the eco-
nomic rationale for secured debtissues by nonfinan-
cial firms. One hypothesis they studied argues that
firms can effect a wealth transfer from unsecured
debtholders to the firms' shareholders by increasing
the default risk ofunsecured debt. This shift occurs
when a firm unexpectedly issues secured debt using
existing assets as collateral. By providing secured
debtholders a higherpriority claimto the cash flows
from some ofthe firm's existing assets, the remain-
ing unsecured claimants are worse off. (This is
similar to the moral hazard hypothesis discussed
earlier.) As Stulz and Johnson pointout, ifthis were
the primary reason secured debt is used, unsecured
debt would contain convenants prohibiting secured
debt issues. II
An alternative hypothesis, referred to by Stulz
and Johnson as the underinvestment hypothesis, is
that the ability to issue secured debt can affect a
firm's investment policy and therefore the sizeofthe
firm's cash flows as well as how cash flows are
distributed among claimants. In particular, the abil-
ity to issue collateralized debt may enable a firm to
undertake profitable new investment opportunities
that it would pass up if constrained to issue
unsecured debt. This can occur when the firm has
risky debt outstanding that pays a contractually
fixed rate ofinterest. The promised paymenton new
unsecured debt will reflect the uncertainty concern-
ing the cash flows associated with the firm's existing
assets as well as the newly acquired asset. However,
if secured debt were used to finance a new project,
the contracted rate would primarily reflect the
uncertainty concerning the cash flows associated
with the new investment opportunity. If the new
investment were relatively low ri:;k, the cost of
secured debt would also be lower than the cost of
unsecured debt. Therefore, the firm may undertake a
project using secured debt that it would pass up if
constrained to issue unsecured claims.
Asimilarargumentcanbe madefor the useofoff-
balance sheet activities by commercial banks. To
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determine when a bank will find it advantageousto
engage in off-balance sheet activities requires
knowledgeofwhen the costoffinancing a new loan
will be less using a loan sale or an SLC than using
deposits. In addition, to determine how off-balance
sheet activities affect the risk of bank deposits
requires examining how these activities affect the
types ofloans a bank will make.
To abstract from the effects of bank regulation
anddepositinsurance, thesequestions are examined
first in the context of a deregulated environment
without·deposit insurance; examination of the
effects ofinsurance and regulation follows.
Cost of Financing
The effects of collateralization on the cost of
financing is analyzed in the context ofa two-period
model. A bank makes a new loan at time t= 0 and
realizes cash flows at time t = 1. The new loan has
payoffs denoted as a2(s), that is, cash flows are
contingent on the state of the world, "s", at time
t= 1. Forsimplicity, the new loan is assumedto have
a face value of$1. The bank is also assumed to have
"booked" loans with payoffs at time t= 1 of a](s).
Booked loans have been financed with a mixture of
deposits and equity.
Ifthe new loan were financed by issuing deposits
promising a payment of rd at time t= 1, then the
realized payment to new depositors in any state
would be
(1)
where Ld equals the sum ofcontracted payments to
depositors. New depositors will receive the con-
tracted payment, rd, ifthe bank does not default; in
the event ofdefault, they receive a proportion ofthe
cash flows from the bank's assets.
Suppose that instead of deposit financing, the
new loan is sold with recourse. The contracted or
promisedpayment to the purchaser ofthe loan is rsr
(this represents 1 plus the contracted interest rate).
This contracted payment will generally be less than
the rate the bank charges on the loan sold - the
difference representing the bank's "spread." The
realized payments to the purchaser ofthe loan willdepend on the promisedrate orrSf and the payments
the purchaser receives in the eventofdefault on the
loansoldandthe sellingbank'sfailure. Denotingthe
cash flows associated with the underlying loan sold
as a2(s), the realized payoffto the loan purchaserfor
a given state is
(2)
where LSf equalsthe sumofthecontracted payments
to the loan purchaser and depositors. In words,
when no default occurs, the loan purchaserreceives
the contractedpaymentrSf' Inthe eventofthe bank's
failure, the purchaser receives rSf when the cash
flows from the loan are sufficient to meet the con-
tracted payment. When not, the purchaser receives
the cash flows from the loan sold, a2(s), plus a
proportion of the cash flows from the bank's other
assets. As discussed in Section11, expression 2 also
describes the cash flows to the lender in the case of
an SLC-backed loan and the cash flow characteris-
tics of a secured deposit claim.
The expression for the realized cash flows for a
loan sold with partial recourse is more complex. Let
a represent the proportion of the loss guaranteed.
The realized cash flow to the purchaser is
min [rSf' a2(s) +min {a[rSf - a2(s)], (3)
a rSf - ais) al(s)}]
L Sf
In words, the purchaser receives either the con-
tracted payment rSf or, in the event of default, the
cash flows from the loan plus either reimbursement
for losses ora proportionalclaimon the bank'sother
assets. When norecourse is provided, a equals zero
and the realized cash flows become simply
(4)
In this case, the rate paid by the purchaser depends
solely on the characteristics ofthe new loan sold.
By comparing the payoff characteristics of new
deposits (expression I) to the payoffcharacteristics
ofa loan sale orSLC-backedloan (expressions 2 or
3), one can determine when the rate paid on collat-
eralized debt will be less than the rate on deposits.
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Specifically, when investors are risk neutral, rSf will
belessthanrd ifandonly if(I)there is somepositive
probability of bank failure with deposit financing
(that is, deposits are risky) and (2) in the event of
default, the cash flows collateralized debtholders
receive are larger than the cash flow new depositors
would receive in the event ofbankruptcy. That is,
(5)
or, for a nonrecourse loan sale: 12
The left hand side of expression 5 is what secured
depositors receive, and the right hand side is what
uninsured depositors would receive in the event of
default. Intuitively, if investors were risk-neutral,
the expected return on deposits and secured debt
must be equal. For the contracted rate on coll'l-t-
eralized debt (that is, the promised payments inves-
tors receive when default does not occur) to be less
than the rate paid on deposits, collateralized debt-
holders (or loan purchasers) must expect higher
payments in the event the bankfails. This condition
is expressed in 5 or 6.
Note that the above discussion suggests that the
difference between rSf and rd will be greater the
higher the probability of bank failure (that is, the
riskier a bank's deposits) and the lower the risk of
the collateral (that is, the default risk of the new
loan). This suggests that collateralization provides
the greatest benefit for high-risk banks investing in
low-risk loans (that is, investment grade credits).
Types of Loans
How does issuing SLCs or selling loans affect a
bank's investment policy, that is, the types of loans
it will make? The effect can be illustrated by the
following example. Suppose a bank has a portfolio
of risky loans and has risky deposits outstanding
(deposits with a positive probability of default).
Ignore deposit insurance for the moment. The con-tracted rate the bank must pay on deposits will
reflect the risk ofdefault.
Assumethat thebankhas an opportunity to invest
in a.new loan that has a positive net present value
and yields a safe or certain return. Ifthe new loan
were financed by issuing additional deposits, inves-
ting.in the loan would reduce the risk of existing
deposits (since they receive a proportional claim in
the cash flows of the new loan). If the existing
deposits pay a contractually fixed interest rate, the
market value ofthe deposits would increase because
the new loan lowers the likelihood of bankruptcy
andincreases the level ofthebank's cash flows. This
outcome implies that old or existing depositors
gain. Moreover, these depositors' gain lowers the
return bank shareholders receive from making the
new loan. The lower return to shareholders reduces
their incentives to make new relatively low risk
loans. This transfer is illustrated numerically in the
box (Case 1).
Selling loans or issuing SLCs provides a bank an
incentive to undertake low risk loans by reducing
this transfer. Recall that the promised rate on colIat-
eralized debt, rsr (or loan sales and SLC-backed
loans), will be lower than the rate paid on new
deposits when the payoffs to secureddebtholders are
largerin the event ofbankfailure (thatis, expression
5or6 holds). However, this implies that, in the event
of failure, existing depositors would receive less
than ifnew deposit claims were issued. Therefore, if
the contracted rate on secured debt is less than the
rate on deposits (that is, expression 5 holds), the
gain existing depositors realize is less, and the
return to shareholders is largerwhen secured debt is
2829issued. Case 2 in the Box provides a numerical
illustration.
An alternative and perhaps more intuitive explan-
ation for how issuing collateralized claims affects
investment policy is that the rate on an SLC-backed
loanorloansale will reflect primarily the riskofthe
new loan(in the case ofa nonrecourse loan sale, the
rate reflects only the risk ofthe new loan). The rate
paidon uninsured deposits will reflect the average
riskofthe bank's loan portfolio. Therefore, the cost
of financing a relatively low risk loan will be less
with loan sales or SLCsthan with deposit claims.
Deposit Insurance
The above discussion is intended to show why a
bank might issue SLCs and sell loans even in the
absence ofregulation and deposit insurance. Intro-
ducing deposit insurance does not affect the basic
conclusions as long as the rate paid on deposits,
including insurancepremiumsandregulatory taxes,
exceeds the risk-free rate. With fixed rate deposit
insurance, the rate on existing deposits will not
adjust fully to reflect the marginal contribution of
the new loan to the overall risk ofthe bank. Indeed,
with complete, that is, 100 percent, insurance, the
cost ofdeposits does not adjust at all to changes in
asset risk. Therefore, a bank with risky deposits
outstanding will tend to underinvest in relatively
lowriskloans and overinvestin highriskloans. This
phenomena is referred to as the underinvestment
problem (see Myers, 1977).
It is important to point out that capital require-
ments can exacerbate the underinvestment problem
and enhance incentives to go "offbalance sheet."
By increasing the amount of equity required to
finance new loans, the gain both existing uninsured
depositors and the FDIC receive from a bank that
undertakes a new low risk loan increases (because
increased capital requirements lowers the risk of
new loans to depositors). Therefore, as capital
requirements are raised (as they were in 1981) loan
sales andSLC issues would beexpected to increase.
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Implications
Thecollateralization argument points out an
important aspect ofoff-balance sheet activities and
restrictions on bank financial policy generally: The
financing techniques available to a bank affect its
investment policy and therefore its overall profit-
ability. This implication is similar to an implication
ofthe regulatory tax hypothesis in that both imply
thatoff-balance sheet activities may permitbanks to
engage in investment opportunities that they might
pass up ifconstrained to use deposit financing.
Moreover, unlike the moral hazard hypothesis
which predicts off-balance sheet activities increase
bank risk, the collateralization hypothesis implies
that the risk of deposits does not necessarily
increase with off-balance sheet activities because
even though leverage may increase, profitable loan
opportunities of lower risk are undertaken13. In
addition, while the collateralization hypothesis is
consistent with the regulatory tax hypothesis dis-
cussed earlier, it suggests that even if regulatory
taxes were eliminated (or extended to off-balance
sheet activities), banks would still have an incentive
(albeit reduced) to engage in loan sales or to issue
SLCs.
The collateralization hypothesis yields important
implications concerning the types of loans sold or
backed by SLCs and the effect ofoff-balance sheet
activities on the default risk ofbank deposits. First,
the collateralized debt argument suggests that rela-
tively low-risk loans will be sold or backed by an
SLC. LPS surveys on loan sales indicate that cur-
rently loan sales are concentratedprimarily in loans
to investment-grade credits. For example, the 1986
LPS survey indicated that two-thirds of the loans
sold by respondents were obligations ofinvestment-
grade borrowing. Second, the riskier abank's exist-
ing deposits (and therefore the higher the rate the
bankmustpay on new uninsured deposits), the more
likely it will be to engage in off-balance sheet
activities. Finally, the collateralization hypothesis
indicates that SLC and loan sales may not adversely
affect the risk of deposits (the same reasoning
explains why unsecured creditors of nonfinancial
firms permit secured debt issues).III. EmpiricalEvidence
The various explanations for why banks issue
SLCs and sell loans have differentimplications for
the effectofthese activities on bankrisk. The moral
hazard hypothesis predicts loan sales and SLCs
increase bank risk, while the regulatory tax and
collateralization hypotheses predict that these
activities do not necessarily increase bank risk.
Ideally, to determine the effect ofthese activities
on the risk of deposits one would examine the
relation between the risk exposure ofthe FDIC and
uninsured depositors and a bank's use ofSLCs and
loan sales. While the FDIC's risk exposure is not
directly observable, one can obtain a measure ofthe
risk premium on a bank's uninsured (or partially
insured) deposits. Assuming uninsured depositors
behave as ifthey are not implicitly fully insured, as
recent evidence by Hannan and Hanweck (1987)
suggests, the moral hazard hypothesis predicts a
positive relation between the risk premium on unin-
sured CDs and the volume ofSLCs and loan sales.
However, if one motive for loan sales or SLC is to
avoid an underinvestment problem or regulatory
taxes, existing depositors as well as bank stock-
holders may be betteroffgivenSLCs and loan sales.
Therefore, finding no significant relation (or anega-
tive relation) between the risk premium on bank
CDs and the volume of SLCs and/or loan sales is
consistent with the collateralization hypothesis and
inconsistent with the moral hazard hypothesis.
To examine the effect ofSLCs and loan sales on
bank risk the relation between the interest cost on
large CDs (deposits in excess of $100,000), the
volume of SLCs and loan sales, and a set of vari-
ables designed to act as proxy for other factors
affecting bank risk is examined.
The interest cost of large CDs is estimated from
informationcontainedintheConsolidatedReportof
Condition and Income. The average rate paid on
CDs is estimated by dividing the total interest paid
on large domestic CDs during a quarter by the
average dollar value of domestic CDs outstanding
during the quarter. A problem with this measure,
noted by previous researchers (seeBaerand Brewer,
1986) is that it fails to account for differences in the
maturities ofCDsoutstanding. 14However, the large
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bank supplement to the Report of Condition con-
tains information on the maturity structure ofCDs
outstanding. From this information, a weighted
average maturity of a bank's CDs can be com-
puted.ls
The interest cost on large CDs in a quarter is
assumed to be a function of several factors: (l) the
average maturity of the CDs outstanding, (2) the
general level of interest rates as measured by aver-
age yield on ninety day Treasury bills over the
quart~r,(3) the leverage ofthe bank, (4) the default
orcreditrisk ofthebank's loan portfolio, and (5)the
interest rate risk ofthe bank.
Month-end quotes for the yield on 90-day Treas-
ury bills in the secondary markets are used to
calculate the average yield on Treasury bills during
each quarter. Financial leverage is estimated as the
ratio of total assets of the bank (or bank holding
company) to the market value oftotal bank capital.
The total market value ofcapital is estimated as the
sum of the book value of subordinated debt and
preferred stock of the bank or bank holding com-
pany and the market value ofcommon stock ofthe
bankorbankholding company. The market value of
common stock outstanding is calculated by multi-
plying the number of shares outstanding at the
beginning of the quarter by the price of the bank's
stock at the beginning ofthe quarter.
Two variables are used to measure the risk of a
bank's asset portfolio. The first measure is th~ provi-
sion for loanand lease losses ineachquarterdivided
by the end of the quarter total of loans and leases
outstanding. A second measure is the variance of
the bank's or bank holding company's monthly
common stock returns for the twelve monthspriorto
the endofeachquarter. Thevarianceinstockreturns
is multiplied by the square ofthe ratiooftheassetto
market value ofequity. This adjustedvariance mea-
sure provides an estimate of the variance.of the
bank's asset returns. 16
The interest rate risk ofthe bank is measured by
the maturity mismatch. b.etween the •bank's assets
and liabilities. A measure of maturity mismatch,
identical to the one used in Flannery andJames
(1984), is constructed from the Call Report. Thismeasure, denoted as "Short" represents the abso-
lute value ofthe difference between dollar value of
assets subject to repricing within one year and the
dollar value ofliabilities subject to repricing within
the same period, divided by the book value of
equity. 17
Data
The empirical analysis is based on a sample of
fifty-eight banks. Banks were included in the sam-
ple if they met the following criterion: (I) informa-
tion for the bank or bank holding company was
contained in the Compustat Quarterly Bank File
during the period 1984 through 1986, and (2) a lead
bank was identifiable in the case of a multibank
holding company.
Only banks containedinthe CompustatQuarterly
BankFile were included because Compustat is used
to obtain monthly stock prices and balance sheet
information for the bank holding companies. Only
bank holding companies with an identifiable lead
bank were included in the sample so balance sheet
items obtained from the leadbank's Call Report will
adequately reflect the holding company's balance
sheet. (Only bank holding companies with the lead
bank constituting 75 percentormore ofthe holding
companies' assets in 1986 were included in the
sample. For the holding companies in the sample,
the assets ofthe leadbank averaged 90percentofthe
holding company assets.)
Quarterly data over the period 1984through 1986
were used to test the model. This period was chosen
because the first full year loan sales were reported in
the Call Report is 1984.
Empirical Results
Table 1 provides descriptive statIstics for the
banks in the sample. It is interesting to note that
SLCs and loan sales constitute a sizable proportion
of the total capital of the bank holding company.
Total SLCs, (the sum of SLCs issued from foreign
and domestic offices) average 95 percent of total
capital, with a maximum value of 12 times total
capital. The average ratio of loan sales to total
capital is 24 percent.
Because the empirical analysis is based on an'
assumption that the rate paid on CDs reflects a
32default risk premium, the first step was to investi-
gate the relation between average CD rates and the
measures ofbank leverage and asset risk described
in theprevioussection. Two models were estimated.
One model relates the average rate paid on CDs to
balance sheet measures ofcredit risk, interest rate
risk, and financial leverage. The second model
relates CD rates to the adjusted variance in the
bank's stock returns over the preceeding 12 months
(which should reflect both interest rate risk and
credit risk) as well as financial leverage.
The results ofthis analysis are reported in Table 2.
The first column ofTable 2 contains the results ofan
OLS regression relating the rate paid on CDs to
Treasury bill rates, the average maturity of the
bank's CDs and balance sheet measures ofrisk. The
second column presents the results of an OLS
regression in which the adjusted variance in the
monthly return on the bank's common stock is used
as proxy for asset risk.
The results in Table 2 are generally consistent
with the hypothesis that CD rates reflect a default
risk premium. With both models, a positive and
statistically significant relation isfound between the
interest cost on CDs and the ratio of assets to total
capital of the holding company. Moreover, the
coefficients on the loan loss variable and on Short
(which measures interest raterisk) are positive and
statistically significant. This result is consistent
with the view that CD rates reflect both the credit
risk and interestrate risk ofthe issuing bank. In the
second column, the. coefficient on the adjusted
variance in monthly stock returns is positive and
statistically significant. 18
To investigate whether "off-balance sheet"
activities affect the risk premium on large CDs, the
33regressions reported in Table 2 were re·estimated
with two additional independent variables: (l) the
ratio of SLCs outstanding to total market value of
capital and (2) the ratio ofloan sales to total market
value ofcapital. Ifthe volume ofSLCs outstanding
or loans sales relative to total capital were to
increase the risk borne by uninsured depositors (and
the FDIC), a positive relation would be expected
between CD rates and SLCs outstanding as well as
loan sales. No significant relation would be
expected under the underinvestment or regulatory
tax hypothesis.
Theresultsofthis analysis are reported in Table 3.
No statistically significantrelation is found between
the rate paid onCDsand eitherSLCs outstandingor
loan sales during the quarter. Moreover, using an
F-test, one cannotreject at the .10 level the hypoth-
esis that the coefficients on SLCs and loan sales are
jointly equal to zero in either model. The results
presented in Table 3 are therefore inconsistent with
the moral hazard hypothesis that SLCs and loan
sales increase bank risk.
Summary and Conclusion
The growth ofloan sales and SLCs in recent years
has raised concerns over the effect of these off-
balance sheet activities on bank risk. How these
activities affect bank risk depends on the reasons
banks undertake them.
34In this paper, I show that one motive for selling
loans and issuing SLCs is that they permit banks to
make relatively low-risk loans that would be
unprofitable to finance with deposits. This suggests
that off-balance sheet activities are not motivated
solelybytheincentivescreatedbydepositinsurance
to increase leverage or asset risk through "offbal-
ance" sheet activities.
The empirical evidence from the CD market.is
consistent with this conclusion. Specifically, loan




1, Loan sales structured as participations differ from what (1986) show that this result is quite sensitive to the assump-
has traditionally been referred to as a participation in the tions concerning forebearance (that IS, closure rules) ofthe
banking literature, The older form of participation is better FDIC,
described as a syndication or assignment, and involves a 8, See Leonard Sloane, "New Securities Tied to Assets",
lead bank negotiating for each bank in the syndicate, New York Times, July 20, 1985, and Lowell Bryan, "The
However, each of the banks in the syndicate make a Selling of American Loans", Wall Street Journal, October
separate loan to the borrowing firm, Recent loan sales, 20,1986,
structured as participations, involve the creation of a new 9, Money center banks hold less capital relative to assets
contract betwe,en the bank and the purchaser of the loan, than most regional or smaller banks, Therefore, it is unclear
The purchasers co~tract IS With the originating bank and why the costof financing the same loan should be lowerfor
not With the bank s loan customer. See Gorton and regional and small banks who are the primary purchasers
Haubrlck (1987) for a diSCUSSion of the contractual of loans, An explanation for this pattern is provided below
aspects of loan participations, when the motives for collateralization are discussed,
2, See Melvin (1986) for a description of the regulatory 10 Another explanation for the use of SLCs and loan sales
treatment of loan sales, If a depOSitory Institution sells a wiih recourse is provided by Benveniste and Berger
loan and agrees to be responSible for 75 percent or less of (1986), They show that the ability to issue securitized
the losses from the loan, then under present regulations, claims can improve the allocation of risk-sharing among a
the proceeds from the sale are not reservable, " bank's debtholders and depositors, In particular, securitiz-
3, Information on loan sales With recourse IS difficult to ation provides some bank claimants a senior claim to
obtain, Available evidence suggests that loans sold With certain assets, If investors were to vary in their degree of
full recourse are rare, The 1985 LPS Survey indicated 13 risk-aversion, securitization may result in a lower cost of
percent of loans sold had a put option, allowing the pur- funds by providing richer risk-sharing opportunities, Ben-
chaser to sell back the loan, In addition, loans sold With full veniste and Berger's model is based on an assumption that
recourse were reported to be only $11 million while non- investors' risk-sharing opportunities outside the bank are
recourse loan sales totaled $26 billion, limited, Their model does, however, yield implications
4, Under the Federal Reserve Board's guidelines, similar to the model developed in this paper.
released for comment February 12, 1986, capital require- 11, A similar argument can be made for banks with unin-
ments for SLCs would vary depending on the account sured deposits and subordinated debt outstanding, More-
party and use of the SLC, For SLCs backing commercial over, the largest issuers of SLCs and sellers of loans are
paper or loans to nongovernment entities, the capital money center and large regional banks with the largest
requirements proposed are identical to those that apply to proportion of uninsured (or partially insured) deposits,
"booked" loans and loans sold With recourse, 12, See James (1987) for aformal proofof this proposition,
5, The payoff characteristics of collateralized debt as w~1I 13, Selling loans or issuing collateralized debt can of
as the effect of collateralized debt Issues on a bank s course increase the risk of deposits, This will occurwhen
investment poliCY are derived formally In James (1987), existing assets are sold or collateralized (that is, when
6, Under Federal law and regulation (12 USC 90 and 12 cash flows to depositors are reduced) or when new loans
CRF 7,7410) national banks may pledge assets against are sold when the activity would have been profitable with
public deposits, However, in 1934, the U,S, SupremeCourt deposit-financing,
ruled that national banks may notpledge assets against 14 Another problem with using the average interest cost
private depOSits, (Texas and Pacific Ry Co, vs, Portorff, of 'large CDs calculated from the Call Report data as a
291, U,S, 245,1934), , , ,proxy for the rate paid on newly issued CDs is that the
7, The regulatory tax hypotheSIS IS based on the propOSI- average interest cost reflects rates paid on CDs issued in
tion that depOSit Insurance IS overpriced (when regulatory previous quarters as well as newly issued CDs, To deter-
taxes are included), The results of empirical studies on the mine whether the average interest cost of CDs is a reason-
under- or overpricing ofdepositguarantees are mixed, For able proxy for the rate offered on CDs in a given quarter, I
example, Marcus and Shaked (1984) find that for large obtained the Innerline survey ofrates paid on newly issued
banks, guarantees are overpriced, Ronn and Verma
35CDs by300 banksforthe first quarterof 1985. Thirty-nine of
the banks in my sample reported rates to Innerline. The
average rate reported by these banks in the Innerline
survey was 9.28 percent. The average interest cost of CDs
from the Call Report is 9.12 percent for that quarter. The
difference in rates is not significantly different from zero.
Moreover, the correlation between the two series is .60.
15, The dollarvolume oftime depositsof $1 00,000ormore
is reported for six maturity categories: one day, 3months or
less, over 3 months to 6 months, over 6 months to 12
months, over 1 year to 5 years, and over 5 years. The
weighted average maturity is calculated in months, with
deposits with a maturity of 3 months or less assigned a
maturity of one month. For the remaining categories, the
maturity of CDs is assumed to be the longest maturity in
that category. For deposits over 5 years, a maturity of 60
months was assigned.
16. This calculation is based on a simplifying assumption
thatthe variance of the return on debt is zero.
17. A larger value of Short implies a greater maturity
mismatch between bank assets and liabilities. The abso-
lute value of the difference between short term assets and
liabilities is used to account for the fact that earnings
variability induced from interest rate changes can arise
through either short-term assets exceeding short-term lia-
bilities or the converse. Reporting requirements necessi-
tated using a one-year dividing line between Short and
long-term assets. See Flannery and James (1984) for a
description of how Short is constructed.
18. The coefficient on the T-bill rate variable of less than
one may appear puzzling. However, note that for this
sample Qf banks the average maturity of CDs outstanding
exceeds 90 days (see Table 1). The results in Table 2 may
reflect the fact that short-term rates (that is, 90 T-bill rates)
are less vQlatile than long-term rates.
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